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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 92-833
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KEVIN ALBRIGHT, PETITIONER v. ROGER
OLIVER, etc., et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the seventh circuit
[January 24, 1994]

 Chief Justice Rehnquist announced the judgment of
the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Justice
O'Connor, Justice Scalia, and Justice Ginsburg
joined.
 A warrant was issued for petitioner's arrest by Illinois
authorities, and upon learning of it he surrendered and
was released on bail.  The prosecution was later dis-
missed on the ground that the charge did not state an
offense under Illinois law.  Petitioner asks us to recog-
nize a substantive right under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to be free from criminal
prosecution except upon probable cause.  We decline to
do so.
 This case comes to us from a decision of the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirming the grant of a
motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and we must therefore
accept the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as
true.  Illinois authorities issued an arrest warrant for
petitioner Kevin Albright, charging him on the basis of
a previously filed criminal information with the sale of
a substance which looked like an illegal drug.  When he
learned of the outstanding warrant, petitioner surren-
dered to respondent, Roger Oliver, a police detective
employed by the city of Macomb, but denied his guilt of
such an offense.  He was released after posting bond,
one of the conditions of which was that he not leave the
State without permission of the court.
 At a preliminary hearing, respondent Oliver testified
that petitioner sold the look-alike substance to Moore,
and the court found probable cause to bind petitioner
over for trial.  At a later pretrial hearing, the court
dismissed the criminal action against petitioner on the
ground that the charge did not state an offense under
Illinois law.
 Albright then instituted this action under Rev. Stat.
1979, 42 U. S. C. 1983, against Detective Oliver in
his individual and official capacity, alleging that Oliver
deprived him of substantive due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment-his -liberty interest--to be free
from criminal prosecution except upon probable cause.
The District Court granted respondent's motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) on the ground that the
complaint did not state a claim under 1983.  The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, 975
F. 2d 343 (1992), relying on our decision in Paul v.
Davis, 424 U. S. 693 (1976).  The Court of Appeals held
that prosecution without probable cause is a constitu-
tional tort actionable under 1983 only if accompanied
by incarceration or loss of employment or some other
-palpable consequenc[e].-  975 F. 2d, at 346-347.  The
panel of the Seventh Circuit reasoned that -just as in
the garden-variety public-officer defamation case that
does not result in exclusion from an occupation, state
tort remedies should be adequate and the heavy weap-
onry of constitutional litigation can be left at rest.-  Id.,
at 347.  We granted certiorari, 507 U. S. ___ (1993),
and while we affirm the judgment below, we do so on
different grounds.  We hold that it is the Fourth
Amendment, and not substantive due process, under
which petitioner Albright's claims must be judged.
 Section 1983 -is not itself a source of substantive
rights,- but merely provides -a method for vindicating
federal rights elsewhere conferred.-  Baker v. McCollan,
443 U. S. 137, 144, n. 3 (1979).  The first step in any
such claim is to identify the specific constitutional right
allegedly infringed.  Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386,
394 (1989); and Baker v. McCollan, supra, at 140.
 Petitioner's claim before this Court is a very limited
one.  He claims that the action of respondents infringed
his substantive due process right to be free of prosecu-
tion without probable cause.  He does not claim that
Illinois denied him the procedural due process guaran-
teed by the Fourteenth Amendment.  Nor does he claim
a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, notwith-
standing the fact that his surrender to the State's show
of authority constituted a seizure for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 19
(1968); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U. S. 593, 596
(1989).
 We begin analysis of petitioner's claim by repeating
our observation in Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U. S.
___, ___ (1992) (slip op., at 9).  -As a general matter,
the Court has always been reluctant to expand the
concept of substantive due process because the guide-
posts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered
area are scarce and open-ended.-  The protections of
substantive due process have for the most part been
accorded to matters relating to marriage, family, procre-
ation, and the right to bodily integrity.  See, e. g.,
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505
U. S. ___, ___ (1992) (slip op., at 5-6) (describing cases
in which substantive due process rights have been recog-
nized).  Petitioner's claim to be free from prosecution
except on the basis of probable cause is markedly
different from those recognized in this group of cases.
 Petitioner relies on our observations in cases such as
United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 746 (1987), and
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U. S. 327, 331 (1986), that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
confers both substantive and procedural rights.  This is
undoubtedly true, but it sheds little light on the scope
of substantive due process.  Petitioner points in particu-
lar to language from Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S.
516, 527 (1884), later quoted in Daniels, supra, stating
that the words -by the law of the land" from the Magna
Carta were -`intended to secure the individual from the
arbitrary exercise of the powers of government.'-  This,
too, may be freely conceded, but it does not follow that,
in all of the various aspects of a criminal prosecution,
the only inquiry mandated by the Constitution is
whether, in the view of the Court, the governmental
action in question was -arbitrary.-
 Hurtado held that the Due Process Clause did not
make applicable to the States the Fifth Amendment's
requirement that all prosecutions for an infamous crime
be instituted by the indictment of a grand jury.  In the
more than 100 years which have elapsed since Hurtado
was decided, the Court has concluded that a number of
the procedural protections contained in the Bill of Rights
were made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment.  See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961),
overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949), and
holding the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule
applicable to the States; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1
(1964), overruling Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78
(1908), and holding the Fifth Amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination applicable to the States;
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784 (1969), overruling
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937), and holding
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment
applicable to the States; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U. S. 335 (1963), overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S.
455 (1942), and holding that the Sixth Amendment's
right to counsel was applicable to the States.  See also
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U. S. 213 (1967) (Sixth
Amendment speedy trial right applicable to the States);
Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14 (1967) (Sixth Amend-
ment right to compulsory process applicable to the
States); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968)
(Sixth Amendment right to jury trial applicable to the
States).
 This course of decision has substituted, in these areas
of criminal procedure, the specific guarantees of the
various provisions of the Bill of Rights embodied in the
first 10 Amendments to the Constitution for the more
generalized language contained in the earlier cases
construing the Fourteenth Amendment.  It was through
these provisions of the Bill of Rights that their Framers
sought to restrict the exercise of arbitrary authority by
the Government in particular situations.  Where a
particular amendment -provides an explicit textual
source of constitutional protection- against a particular
sort of government behavior, -that Amendment, not the
more generalized notion of `substantive due process,'
must be the guide for analyzing these claims.-  Graham
v. Connor, 490 U. S., at 395.
 We think this principle is likewise applicable here.
The Framers considered the matter of pretrial depriva-
tions of liberty, and drafted the Fourth Amendment to
address it.  The Fourth Amendment provides:
-The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.-
We have in the past noted the Fourth Amendment's
relevance to the deprivations of liberty that go hand in
hand with criminal prosecutions.  See Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U. S. 103, 114 (1975) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable
cause as a prerequisite to any extended restraint on
liberty following an arrest).  We have said that the
accused is not -entitled to judicial oversight or review of
the decision to prosecute.-  Id., at 118-119.  See also
Beck v. Washington, 369 U. S. 541, 545 (1962); Lem
Woon v. Oregon, 229 U. S. 586 (1913).  But here
petitioner was not merely charged; he submitted himself
to arrest.
 We express no view as to whether petitioner's claim
would succeed under the Fourth Amendment, since he
has not presented that question in his petition for
certiorari.  We do hold that substantive due process,
with its -scarce and open-ended- -guideposts,- Collins v.
Harker Heights, 503 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9), can
afford him no relief.
 The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore

                                   Affirmed.